This paper uses historical studies as a means to explore the relation of organizations to subjectivity. The first part of the paper illustrates this relation through exploring the work of Elias, Kieser and Brewer. It focuses on the interrelation between 18th-century freemasonry, the emergence of complex financial credit networks and figurational shifts in power relation. The second part of the paper uses the prior analysis in order to engage with recent debate concerning history, organizations and subjectivity. First, the issue of whether we can ascribe continuity, closure and unity to subjectivity is examined. Second, the 'default' assumption of historical continuity is debated, drawing on studies by Baert, Jacques, Halttunen and Morgan. In contrasting between 'traditional' history and the alternative assumptions contained in post-structural and Foucauldian work, the paper argues for openness rather than rebuttal of particular positions. It suggests that subjectivity, such as that of employees, should be thought of as mobile, yet selectively continuous. It also argues that it is unnecessary to choose between historical positions, such as that which prioritizes historical discontinuity over continuity (or vice versa).
Introduction
In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in organizations and employee subjectivity. Writers have addressed managerial attempts to 'manage' subjectivity, whether through activities such as culture change programmes (e.g. Kunda 1992) or through the delivery of 'appropriate' emotional labour (Hochschild 1983; Fineman 2000) . Others have lamented the neglect within organization studies of 'the way in which power relations are subjectively experienced' (Collinson 1994: 52) or pleaded for researchers to address the emotional flavour of everyday organizational life (Albrow 1992) . At the same time, this growing interest in employee subjectivity has been theorized from a misleading to equate Foucault with an historical perspective ' (2002: 528) and they are dismissive of those who deploy Foucault. For instance, they are highly critical of Roy Jacques's (1996) influential Foucauldian study of the history of organization and subjectivity, asserting that 'Jacques uses a series of familiar Foucauldian ruses to avoid debating his historical claims' (Rowlinson and Carter 2002: 540) .
In discussing historical assumption and method, the present paper will contribute to this debate. Part II focuses on Baert's (1998) discussion of Foucault, extending it through a re-analysis of Jacques's (1996) study. The latter work provides a point of contrast to those of Kieser, Brewer or Elias (addressed in the first part of the paper) since it principally relies for its effect on assumptions of historical discontinuity rather than continuity. Yet it will be argued below that Jacques's assumption of sharp historical discontinuity can be as problematic as that which assumes linear continuity. In addition, it will be suggested that continuity and discontinuity do not present mutually exclusive choices for historical analysis, and that we do not have to choose between a Foucauldian sense of 'rupture' and a traditional historical interest in continuity across time.
In sum, in this paper I wish to examine a particular historical 'story' and use it to explore contentious issues relating to the nature of history, organization and subjectivity. I will put forward particular theses that arise from the interrelation of the work of Kieser, Brewer and Elias, but then question the assumptions upon which these theses rest through reference to Foucault, Baert, Jacques, Halttunen and Morgan, among others. In so doing, the first part of the paper will explore and illustrate the interest of historical analysis to organization studies. The second part of the paper will then debate some key assumptions of historical inquiry, drawing on material across disciplinary boundaries.
Part I
Four important qualifications must be made with regard to the two historical studies examined below. Firstly it must be stressed that I do not wish to imply that the only influences upon emergent bourgeois subjectivity are those described by Kieser and Brewer. Secondly, there are the usual constraints of social and historical research. As with contemporary social science analysis, historical research is characterized by 'finitude and incompleteness' (Bryant 1994: 5) and is always partial. Just as when we focus on the present, historical analysis is always selecting particular 'voices', and editing, interpreting and representing our 'material' within implicit or explicit narratives. Thirdly, a limitation of Kieser's and Brewer's argument is its androcentrism: both tend to implicitly assume that, in understanding 18th/19th-century subjectivity, we need only refer to the male bourgeois subject. Fourthly, I employ Elias because of his relevance to social discipline. It is not my current intention however to provide a critique of Elias (see Newton 1998b , 2003a , for such critique).
Kieser: Disciplined Subjectivity
Kieser's (1998) study provides an introduction to what follows. Using secondary sources, it attempts to show the historical interrelation between organization and subjectivity. Kieser's analysis begs the following question: What did early organizations look like, and in what ways did early organizations encourage a 'disciplined' subjectivity? More specifically, Kieser (1998) argues that though writers such as Elias, Weber, Oestrich and Foucault have alerted us to the gradual disciplining of the self within western society, we still lack studies that explore the instantiation of such discipline within early organizational forms. As Kieser notes:
'None of these theories trace processes of disciplinization up to the early factories. On the other hand, studies of disciplinization during industrialization do not raise the question of how the factory owners and their confidants learned to organize and discipline. ' (1998: 52) In consequence, we cannot answer questions such as: ' Where, then, did the designers of the early organizations come from? Moreover, from where did they get the personnel responsible for running these institutions and in command of the necessary self-discipline? ' (1998: 48) Kieser asserts that prior to the 18th century much of our present sense of organizational discipline did not exist, a situation which we often overlook because we take many elements of organizational behaviour for granted, such as time-keeping and punctuality, or accepting authority based on hierarchy rather than pre-modern criteria such as social rank. As Kieser comments:
'Today, organizational behaviour has become so common that we are no longer aware of the amount of learning about new behaviour that members of the early organizations had to manage. ' (1998: 48, emphasis added) Kieser's paper focuses on what he sees as the 'first formal organizations' in 18th-century Germany (1998: 46) , namely, those of freemasonry, and reading and patriotic societies. His central thesis is that these organizations engendered a self-discipline among their members which was subsequently 'urgently needed in the process of industrialization ' (1998: 49) .
In sum, Kieser challenges the notion that the interweaving of organization and subjectivity is simply a 20th-century phenomena, as reflected in Taylorism, human and neo-human relations, organization development, corporate culture, or the study of emotion work (Hochschild 1983; Rose 1990; Hollway 1991) . Instead, Kieser reveals how the interrelation of organization with subjectivity was integral to modern organization. Indeed, he suggests that what particularly distinguishes early organizations was their association with modernity. German 18th-century freemasonry is deserving of the label 'organization' precisely because it enshrined a number of features that distinguished it from the pre-modern. For instance, freemasonry organizations 'constructed the first hierarchies, the origins of which were divorced from either kinship or feudal tradition' (Kieser 1998: 55) . Unlike feudal and pre-modern society, membership of freemasonry was also voluntary and its rules and practices, though involving significant ritual elements reminiscent of feudal tradition, nevertheless enshrined a rational and modern organizational spirit, offering their members a chance to 'broaden their horizons from being confined within the barriers of religion, nation, estate, and language ' (1998: 55) . At the same time, the secrecy of freemasonry 'provided a shield under which it was possible to practice new forms of behaviour without disturbing the ruling order and without having to expose oneself to others ' (1998: 56) .
Kieser argues that central to this modernist project was the promotion of social discipline. Masonic lodges provided 'a field of exercises for the acquisition of self-discipline ' (1998: 65) . This was furthered through the promotion of virtuous behaviour such as punctuality and the enjoyment of 'dutiful' and 'useful' work (1998: 54) , and through exercises designed to make members 'more well-mannered, self-controlled, and moderate ' (1988: 57) . In this manner, the aim was to 'produce enlightened human beings able to bring reason to triumph over passion ' (1988: 54) . Kieser therefore implies that organizing and social discipline have long been interwoven and that the discipline associated with the industrial employee was prefigured within early modern organizations such as the Masonic lodge.
Elias, Brewer and Bourgeois Sensibility: Liberation and Discipline
From the perspective of Elias, we need to explore the figurational context of the disciplined subjectivity which Kieser (1998) associates with freemasonry. As Elias notes, 'actions and ideas cannot be explained and understood if they are considered on their own; they need to be understood and explained within the framework of [figurations] ' (1970: 96) . For Elias, figurations refer to the interdependency networks that have gradually developed across the changing social and political landscape of particular epochs. They reflect the 'underlying regularities by which people in a certain society are bound over and over again to particular patterns of conduct and very specific functional chains, for example as knights and bondsmen, kings and state officials, bourgeois and nobles ' (1994: 489) . This stress on interdependencies reflects Elias's depiction of power as relational, as a 'game' where 'the participants always have control "over each other"' (Elias 1970: 81, original emphasis).
Kieser's (1998) study points to the figurational context of freemasonry. For example, Kieser notes that freemasonry was relevant to the changing interdependencies between the nobility and the growing bourgeoisie in 18th-century Germany since Masonic lodges simultaneously offered 'a compensation for the loss of functions' for the nobility and 'a fulfilment of its need for prestige and recognition' for the emergent bourgeois (1998: 55). Nevertheless Kieser's (1998) study lacks a detailed attention to the figurational context in which Germany freemasonry developed. In this context, John Brewer's (1982) analysis of 18th-century English freemasonry is of particular interest. It illustrates how the social discipline of one kind of early modern organization, namely freemasonry, appears figurationally interwoven in England with changing interdependencies, namely those associated with emergent networks of financial credit. In other words, Brewer's analysis can be seen as illustrative of Elias's argument.
There are clear differences between Brewer's (1982) and Kieser's (1998) analyses. The former contains primary historical source material whereas the latter is chiefly reliant on secondary sources. In addition, one study relates to England, the other to Germany. Yet in relation to the latter difference, social historians such as Margaret Jacob assert that, though Masonic lodges might vary in the social mix, ritual and finance, there was nevertheless remarkable commonality among British, French, Dutch and German freemasonry in terms of their 'masonic rhetoric, principles and practices ' (1993: 113) . Jacob argues that 'what holds true for British freemasonry seems to hold true for continental freemasonry ' (1993: 113) . While noting such argument, we must however be wary of neglecting differences between English and German freemasonry and the figurational context in which they developed. For instance, Kieser argues that commerce and credit were not significant to the development of freemasonry in Germany (personal communication, 2001 ) even though, as we shall see, Brewer and others suggest it was highly significant to English freemasonry. This difference receives support from Elias in his argument that 'the commercial professional bourgeoisie ... [was] relatively undeveloped in most German states in the eighteenth century ' (1994: 22) . Yet these differences do not detract from the central Eliasian implication of Brewer's analysis -that both early modern organizations and disciplined subjectivity need to be seen within a particular figurational context, namely the emerging commercial networks of the English eighteenth century. Brewer's (1982) analysis suggests that in order to understand fully such early modern organizations as English freemasonry, we need to explore the relationship between emergent commercial networks and the bourgeoisie. His analysis focuses on this latter relationship in the context of 18th-century England and it makes a number of interrelated arguments. Firstly Brewer argues that financial credit was highly significant to social change in England in the 18th century, as a consequence of the spread of credit instruments such as mortgages and inland bills of exchange. These financial devices proved highly flexible, a characteristic which encouraged their use so that 'producers, distributors and consumers were linked not only by the products of the market, but also by a highly elaborate (and extremely delicate) web of credit ' (1982: 205, emphasis added) . Secondly, Brewer suggests that for the emerging English bourgeoisie, credit networks represented a source of liberation from the 'client economy', the feudal legacy of a 'nation conveniently divided into the two classes of "patricians" and "plebeians"' (Brewer 1982: 197) . Formerly, peasants, labourers or traders had been heavily dependent upon the aristocracy since they constituted the principal source of income or livelihood. Growing credit networks meant that the emergent bourgeoisie had access to alternative sources of finance than that of the patrician class. In consequence, the availability of credit was one principal means by which 'the middling sort or bourgeoisie ... began ... to distinguish themselves socially and politically from the patrician elite and the labouring poor ' (1982: 197) . Yet though credit was a source of liberation from the client economy, it also represented a continual threat for the emergent bourgeois. Both personal circumstances and market volatility meant that being in credit generally implied continuing, and serious, risk. The consequence of indebtedness could be severe since continued inability to meet debts usually resulted in imprisonment, 'a hazardous and expensive experience' since 'fever was rampant' and many debtors 'found themselves even more heavily in debt because of the expenses incurred in gaol' (Brewer 1982: 211) . Brewer (1982) argues that these simultaneous credit elements of liberation and risk encouraged two related developments -first, the emergence of early forms of organization such as freemasonry, and second, changes in subjectivity associated with the 'social discipline' of credit and commerce. With the first, Brewer's studies suggest that English freemasonry was figurationally grounded in liberation from a client economy and in emerging credit networks. 'Liberation' was aided by the composition and the activities of freemasonry lodges (and other 'clubs'). Like their American counterparts (see Blumin 1989) , membership of English Masonic lodges was 'drawn from all social groups' and 'often transcended traditional social, economic and religious boundaries' (Brewer 1982: 219) .
1 Aside from the breakdown of traditional social barriers that this wide composition represented, freemasonry lodges also furthered the attack on the client economy by providing a collective insurance against the 'spectre of debt' (Leyshon and Thrift 1997: 17 ) that credit networks entailed. As Brewer notes, 'joining a club [whether freemasonry or otherwise] enabled the tradesman to extend the ambit of his acquaintance, to meet potential customers, creditors and partners in a highly convivial, and amicable atmosphere ' (1982: 222) . In so doing 'masonic lodges and pseudo-masonic societies also helped cushion their members against indebtedness and social misfortune' (Brewer 1982: 220) . The perils of credit were ameliorated because 'masons would rally round a brother whose creditors threatened to foreclose on him' (Brewer 1982: 220) . As Brewer argues, freemasonry 'association became a way of escaping economic clientage whilst providing protection against the vicissitudes of the open market ' (1982: 200) . 2 In an Eliasian sense, Brewer's study indicates that freemasonry was therefore part of a broad figurational change. The 'liberation' of freemasonry was figurationally embedded within the liberation provided by the new financial interdependency networks, namely 'webs of credit'. In Eliasian terms, the marked asymmetry of a client economy where the poor were heavily dependent on the whims of the rich became ameliorated by the 'functional democratization' (Elias 1994 : 503) of a developing credit economy where 'the fortunes of the lender were tied to those of the borrower' (Brewer 1982: 229, emphasis added) . Critically, the 'power game' (Elias 1970: 81) had shifted since the increased availability of credit reduced the prior asymmetry between patrician and plebeian, and furthered the development of the bourgeoisie. In other words, credit networks played a constitutive role in changing power relations (Ingham 1999) , and Brewer's analysis suggests that freemasonry was embedded within this figurational shift through its erosion of social barriers and its collective insurance against credit risk.
In a similar fashion, the changes in social discipline that Kieser attributes to freemasonry also appear embedded in a wider figurational context within Brewer's analysis. For Brewer (1982) , both freemasonry and social discipline appear situated within the figurational development represented by credit and commercial networks. As Brewer argues:
'Affability, courtesy and reliability were all qualities to make up a business character and a trade ethic. Such attitudes oiled the wheels of commerce ... But they also served as a check or constraint, a means of ordering and regulating the trading community in such a way as to protect its members by reducing the risks involved in credit or debt. In sum, the mannerly conduct necessary to improve business and secure credit was as much a form of social discipline as those values connected with work itself.' (Brewer 1982: 215, emphasis added) Brewer's thesis is quite clear: credit and commercialization encouraged a fashioning of the self toward both civility and probity. Brewer notes that foreign visitors to London such as Pierre Jean Grosley (1772) 'remarked on the extraordinary civility of the shopkeepers and tradesmen ' (1982: 214) . At the same time, 'presentation of the self as sober, reliable, candid and constant was not merely a question of genteel manners, but a matter of economic survival' (Brewer 1982: 214) . In making this argument, Brewer is of course far from alone. Direct support for the significance of English credit networks to social discipline is contained in detailed social historical work such as that of Julian Hoppit (1986 Hoppit ( , 1987 Hoppit ( , 1990 and Craig Muldrew (1993 Muldrew ( , 1998 see Newton 2003b ). In addition, the significance of commerce as a social discipline was noted by 18th-century observers such as Defoe (1969 Defoe ( [1725 ) and Montesquieu: as Montesquieu notes, 'commerce ... polishes and softens barbarian ways ' (1949: i; quoted in Sennett 1998: 140) . Related arguments have been proposed and debated by a number of social historians including Pocock (1985) , Langford (1989) , Barker-Benfield (1992) , Morgan (1994) and Klein (1995) . Yet what Brewer's analysis does in Eliasian terms is to place this commercial discipline within a figurational context, namely the financial interdependency networks associated with 'webs of credit', and the reduced political asymmetry (between patrician and plebeian) and increased risk (of penury) associated with such networks. This does not however imply that Eliasian argument is without limitation, and elsewhere I have employed the history of credit and money in order to discuss, and critique, the work of Elias (Newton 2003a) .
3 Yet Brewer's analysis does suggest that, at least in early English modernity, changes in subjectivity toward a greater social discipline may have reflected a more commercialized self because they were figurationally grounded within developing credit networks.
Part II
The above analyses have re-examined Kieser's (1998) study through reference to Elias and Brewer. In so doing, they support the thesis that 'organization' and 'subjectivity' are interrelated. As Brewer's (1982) work indicates, Masonic lodges represented a transformation of social interdependencies. On the one hand, they encouraged new forms of social discipline. Yet on the other, English freemasonry helped to liberate its members from the former social discipline associated with patrician favour and plebeian dependence (Brewer 1982) . As organizations, English Masonic lodges therefore encouraged a radical change since they created interdependency networks beyond that previously circumscribed by kinship or feudal relations. At the same time, Brewer's study illustrates how the 'organizing' of subjectivity is not just a 20th-or 21st-century phenomena -as witnessed in Taylorism, teamwork, organization development, organizational culture, emotional labour, etc. -but instead appears prefigured within early modern organizations such as freemasonry as well as the broader financial interdependencies in which they were embedded. 'Modern' organization and 'organized' subjectivity appear interwoven whether we are concerned with corporate culture or the 18th-century Masonic lodge.
Taken together, Kieser's (1998) and Brewer's (1982) analyses inform our understanding of what 'organization and organizing' represent by depicting (1) their relation to modernity, (2) their significance for subjectivity and social discipline and (3) their embedding within broad figurational change such as that associated with emergent credit networks. Yet, at the same time, these analyses rely on certain assumptions about historical inquiry. In the second half of this paper, I wish to debate these assumptions and thereby further explore what we mean by history, organization and subjectivity. In other words, though I have tried above to illustrate the interest of history, I do not wish to avoid its controversies, particularly those that arise in relation to postmodern argument (Rowlinson and Procter 1999) . In particular, I will question whether:
1 we can talk about subjectivity in the same manner as Kieser, Brewer and Elias? Can we ascribe continuity, closure or unity to the bourgeois subject? Do we not need to address how subjectivity is intersected by class, gender, age, ethnicity, etc.? 2 we can speak of historical continuity? This assumption is critical to the argument of Kieser and Brewer. For instance, Kieser effectively asserts that industrial society inherited the social discipline which he associates with early organizational forms such as that of freemasonry. Similarly, Brewer argues that 'the values espoused to obtain a creditworthy society may have had just as significant a social impact as those intended to secure an industrious and compliant workforce' (Brewer 1982: 215) . Such statements clearly imply continuity across time, whereby the 'selfdiscipline' acquired in one period is 'vital' in its subsequent employment. Yet, as writers such as Foucault have suggested, can we assume such continuity? Detailed reference will be made to the work of Jacques (1996) since it provides a study of organization, subjectivity and discipline which invokes discontinuity, rather than continuity, to achieve much of its effect.
In sum, studies such as that of Kieser (1998) and Brewer (1982) help to place our understanding of the interweaving of organization and subjectivity within a historical context. Yet they rely on historical assumptions which have been questioned by postmodern and post-structural debate. I shall now address such debate by first exploring whether we can speak of continuity of subjectivity, and second, examining whether we can invoke historical continuity at all.
Subjectivity and Continuity
The writers discussed in this paper have generally assumed that there is a coherence, commonality and continuity within the subjectivity of particular groups and classes. For instance, both Kieser (1998) and Brewer (1982) assume that there was a shared male bourgeois subjectivity of discipline and civility associated with early organizations, and similar comments could be made of Elias's general treatment of courtly and bourgeois society (Elias 1983 (Elias , 1994 . All these writers also suggest that earlier forms of subjectivity influenced -and therefore had some continuity with -later periods. Yet sensitivity to our present-day post-structural inheritance, and perhaps especially the influence of the (rather structural) Foucault, has tended to make many readers cautious about ascribing a unity, coherence or continuity to the self. The argument is made that the subject does not exist prior to culture, and since culture is itself fluid, fragmented and pluralistic, so must the self inhabit a land of 'molecular multiplicities' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 30) . Historical sociologists, social historians and organizational analysts alike are generally aware, and wary of, this argument. For instance, the social historian Ann Bermingham draws on Foucault in order to question whether 'classes are homogeneous, and identity is unified and transparent ' (1995: 14) . She further argues that 'rather than seeing class and identity as stable and homogenous we need to see them as mobile, fragmented and inventive ' (1995: 14) . Similar arguments are common in gender studies (e.g. Ferguson 1993 ) and within social theory more generally. They imply that writers such as Kieser and Brewer take too much for granted in their portrayal of 18th-century male bourgeois identity since there remains a need to consider the stability of such identities and the way in which bourgeois society was intersected by gender, class, ethnicity, etc.
Yet though such writers rightly question the 'homogenisation' of subjectivity, there also remains a need to question post-structural representations of the self. This is a broad and complex issue, and discussion here must remain brief and focused. On the one hand, it is clear that 18th-century writers spoke of a notion of the self that was implicitly underwritten by assumptions of class, gender and colonialism (Wilson 1995) . Furthermore, writers concerned with early commerce and commercial discipline, such as Daniel Defoe (1969 Defoe ( [1725 ), largely assumed that they were addressing a male bourgeois subject. Yet while such implicit attributions need to be critically examined, this does not necessarily imply the wholesale rejection of a coherent self, or shared experience among particular groups. To put this another way, is our subjectivity really so particular, fragmented, mobile and fragile that writers such as Brewer and Kieser can no longer allude to, say, a bourgeois subject?
If we follow Elias, our subjectivity is not entirely fragile and fragmented, but neither is it stable and determined. Central to this perspective is the concept of habitus, or what Elias also called our 'second nature'. 4 The notion of habitus represents one way in which Elias links the individual with the collective:
'The make-up, the social habitus of individuals forms, as it were, the soil from which grow the personal characteristics through which an individual differs from other members of his society. In this way something grows out of the common language which the individual shares with others and which is certainly a component of his social habitus -a more or less individual style, what might be called an unmistakable individual handwriting that grows out of the social script. ' (1991: 182) Thus the courtier lives within the habitus of courtly society, or the bourgeois within that of the bourgeoisie. While he or she is not defined by such society, it forms the 'soil', the social script from which develops the individual script.
If we apply Elias's sense of habitus to the foregoing argument, our attention is drawn to the likelihood that subjectivity is likely to be intersected by social stratification since gender, class, and ethnicity all imply variation in figurational context. Habitus implies a sharing of social scripts, but any one individual is likely to be implicated within a plethora of scripts (Ferguson 1993) . Following Elias therefore, the analyses presented by the likes of Kieser (1998 ), Brewer (1982 , and indeed Elias himself, are open to the charge that they focus on particular groups, yet have a tendency to expand their analyses to encompass the entire social universe. But at the same time, Elias's stress upon habitus underlines that all is not fragmentation, that there is some stability to our subjectivity reflected in the ingrained, and shared, scripts which we carry through time and space. While there may be no unity to subjectivity, this does not mean that we do not share many of the same 'fragments' with others. Furthermore, many of these fragments show shortto medium-term stability, as reflected in the continuance of social codesvoice, posture, codes of formality or informality -among a particular class, ethnic group or gender. In consequence, though there is a need for caution, it makes sense to talk of some degree of coherence, commonality and continuity, such as the shared bourgeois subjectivity of discipline and civility which Kieser ascribes to early organizations, or which Brewer identifies with commercial society. As Elias argues, it is not that people are defined by such habitus, or that it is static and immune to change. Yet at the same time, it does refer to social scripts that are shared for a while across time and space, reflected as much in bodily habits as value or attitude.
Historical Continuity?
The 'post-structurally aware' reader may feel that the above arguments are all very well but they do not address the 'default' position of history, particularly its bias towards continuity. After all, the argument for history is frequently justified by the assumption that the present secretes the past through a channelled and selective continuity. As Joseph Bryant asserts: 'present arrangement[s] -institutions, roles, cultural forms -are the product of past human actions. The "past" is thus never really "past", but continuously constitutive of the "present", as a cumulatively and selectively reproduced ensemble of practices and ideas that "channel" and impart directionality to ongoing human agency.' (Bryant 1994: 11, added emphasis) We assume, for example, that we can learn about industrial or contemporary organizations from researching the 'selective channelling' of earlier organizational forms. This is Kieser's and Brewer's gambit. Both argue that freemasonry or 'creditworthy society' (Brewer 1982: 215) are vital to the social discipline of the later industrial age. One can extend this kind of argument further. For example, it might even be suggested that the emotional labour which Hochschild associates with the mid-20th century onward is related, in part, to the interweaving of organizing and social discipline which Kieser and Brewer associate with early modern organizations, or even to Elias's study of court society (Wouters 1989; Newton 1998b) . But can we in any way justify such assertions of continuity, whether short-or long-term? In order to address this question I shall consider Patrick Baert's (1998) discussion of Foucault, illustrating it through detailed reference to a study of organization, subjectivity and discipline which invokes discontinuity, rather than continuity, namely that of Roy Jacques (1996) .
Foucault remains of interest because he appears as the historian's bête noire, especially where he is seen as symbolic of what is very loosely termed the postmodern 'turn'. For many historians, crude postmodernism appears to reduce 'the historian's work ... to its ideological positions' (Evans 1997: 219) . Its 'profoundly relativist' connotations (Hobsbawm 1997: 271) threaten to 'dispense with professional university historians altogether' (Evans 1997: 205) . Similarly, as Rowlinson and Carter argue, 'advocates of Foucault in organization studies largely ignore the damming criticism of his work from historians ' (2002: 531) . It could also be added that 'organizational Foucauldians ... tend to ignore the wider criticism of Foucault within the social sciences' (Newton 1998a ). Yet although some historians see Foucault as a 'very bad' historian (Bentley 1999: 141) , and postmodernism is seriously questioned (e.g. Elton 1991; Evans 1997; Hobsbawm 1997) , it is difficult deny the influence of the postmodern and post-structural thinking, with which Foucault, rightly or wrongly, is associated. Furthermore, for those who are not historians, it may seem extraordinary to dismiss either Foucauldian or poststructural argument when it has generated considerable creative argument within the social sciences. In addition, some historians acknowledge that Foucault had 'a historical imagination' (Smith 2000: 107) , while even Rowlinson and Carter admit that Foucault's 'writings proved to be a powerful stimulant for a new wave of historiographical publications ' (2002: 534) .
In relation to such argument and debate, Baert's discussion of Foucault is particularly interesting. Baert firstly makes the conventional point that Foucault detracted from the assumption of continuity (Poster 1984) . As Foucault notes, 'discontinuity was the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the historian's task to remove from history ' (1989: 8) . As Baert (1998) argues, in his archeological period Foucault identified himself with a 'new' history that, instead of concealing discontinuity, made it their subject matter so that it became transferred 'from the obstacle to the work itself' (Foucault 1989: 9) . Similarly in his genealogical work, Foucault emphasizes that genealogy is about 'the accidents, the minute deviations -or conversely, the complete reversals ' (1977: 146) , rather than about preserving the semblance of historical continuity. As Baert observes, the search for the 'rupture' and discontinuity remained a distinct (and ironically, continuing) feature of Foucault's work across both his archeological and genealogical periods. Baert links this strategy to French historians of science such as Bachelard and Canguilhem who opposed a continuous conception of history. Foucault's deployment of this stance was not however just about continuing this scepticism to traditional history, but about questioning the present. Through attending to discontinuities and ruptures, Foucault both contrasted between periods, and provided a distinct point of contrast with the present day. Baert asserts that this search for discontinuity and rupture was therefore central to Foucault's method precisely because it provided historical contrasts which allowed him to 'elucidate and undercut present belief and ethical systems' (Baert 1998: 124) . In other words, unearthing discontinuity was vital to Foucault's problematization of the present. The central implication of Baert's analysis is that, just as the traditional historical stereotype biases continuity, Foucault biases discontinuity. It might of course be objected here that Foucault partly portrays continuity, such as that of ancient Greece (1987 Greece ( , 1990 or post-panoptic modernity (1979) . Yet Baert's argument is that discontinuity and rupture are nevertheless key tools in Foucault's 'history of the present', central to his method.
As I have already explored historical analyses which rely on continuity, I shall now explore Baert's thesis by focusing on a study which assumes discontinuity, namely Roy Jacques's (1996) analysis of the historical production of the 'employee'. Jacques (1996) provides one of the most detailed Foucauldian studies of the historical interrelation between organization and subjectivity, and in consequence I shall focus on his study in some detail. Underlying Jacques's study is a Foucauldian commitment to discontinuity. As Jacques notes, he aims to illustrate the 'discontinuity in people's mode of consciousness, a rupture in common sense' (Jacques 1996: 96, emphasis added) . For Jacques to achieve this task, it is necessary to draw a strong contrast between two periods -which necessarily means that their continuities must be downplayed. Jacques follows his mission by contrasting the US employee subjectivity of the late 19th/early 20th century with that which he portrays as preceding it, what he calls 'Federalist reality'. Jacques argues that the latter represented the triumph of a particular code of behaviour over the continuation of a European 'feudal order based on a landed aristocracy' (Jacques 1996: 24, emphasis added) . This Federalist code valued honour, honesty, integrity, benevolence and, especially, self-reliance. It was typified by the business writings of Freeman Hunt (1857) and his commercial journal, Hunt's Merchant's Magazine. For Jacques, Freeman Hunt exemplified the 'discourse of character ' (1996: 27) which underwrote 'the conduct of an upright man of business' (Hunt 1857 : 28, quoted in Jacques 1996 .
Jacques argues that although the Federalist discourse of character triumphed within American society, its relevance was subsequently erased by rapid industrialization. In consequence, 'the difference between Federalist and industrial realities provides a point of rupture across which meanings cannot be transported' (Jacques 1996: 144, emphasis added) . This rupture was characterized by the emergence of management discourse (such as Taylorism), modelled around a new subject, namely, the employee. In contrast to the self-reliance of the Federalist citizen who 'was his own person' (Jacques 1996: 71) , the employee represented a 'human resource' (Jacques 1996: 72) . Whereas the Federalist citizen controlled his own work process, was paid according to outcomes and saw subordination as 'one of the ills of aristocratic Europe', the employee was a subordinate, a wage worker who sold 'a unit of time' (Jacques 1996 : 76, original emphasis) rather a product, and an individual who experienced a fundamentally divided self. Industrialization and its new management practices occasioned a split between businessman, politician and lawyer; a divorce of women from perceived production; and a separation between the roles of producer and consumer. According to Jacques, these changes were so profound that the world of the employee was 'alien to the reality of the Federalist citizen ' (1996: 70) . A rupture had occurred within the space of 50 years resulting in 'a radically different order' (Jacques 1996: 78) due to 'fundamental shifts in belief about human nature ' (1996: 123) . In sum, instead of Kieser's or Brewer's continuity of social discipline, Jacques emphasizes the discontinuity that resulted from the displacement of Federalist 'upright' self-reliant subjectivity by that of the newly Taylorized employee who, in contrast, appeared as an 'ignorant, childlike ... self', dependent on 'knowledgeable, adult and capable ... managers and professional "experts"' (1996: 82). Jacques's (1996) study presents a notable contrast in historical method to the studies of organization and social discipline provided by Kieser and Brewer. Yet it remains limited because of its failure to situate Freeman Hunt within the historiography of management thought. Hunt's significance is assumed by Jacques rather than demonstrated. For example, though we are told that 'Hunt was a good reflection of the business "common sense" of his time' (Jacques 1996: 26) , limited evidence is presented to substantiate this claim. In addition, questions arise with Jacques's portrayal of rupture because of the closure which he forces upon his Federalist citizen and his emergent employee. Jacques's 'rupture' derives from a contrast between two social classes, namely the bourgeois realities of Freeman Hunt's socially climbing merchants, retailers and entrepreneurs, and the new working class associated with industrialization and the Taylorized employee. Yet Jacques's argument appears difficult to sustain. In particular, the work of a number of social historians (Halttunen 1982; Blumin 1989; Morgan 1994) suggests that Jacques forces his contrast in order to achieve a sense of rupture. For instance, such work suggests that there was no prior unified bourgeois subjectivity in mid-19th-century America or Europe centred around a particular set of values, character or conduct -whether Jacques's Federalist values or English and American 'polite society'. Instead these studies indicate a competition between desired bourgeois codes of behaviour, such as that between Christian moralist prescription for 'upright' character and conduct (Morgan 1994) and the desire to 'cultivate a showy appearance at the expense of moral character' (Halttunen 1982: 63) .
The work of social historians, Karen Halttunen (1982) and Marjorie Morgan (1994) , is of particular interest here since they illustrate these competing bourgeois social codes within the US and England respectively. They both argue that the concern for 'show' and impression management 'triumphed' over the moral prescription for upright 'character' associated with Jacques's Federalist bourgeois subjectivity, and that the former represented a refashioning of aristocratic codes of behaviour. As Halttunen argues, 'after 1830, the American middle classes proudly proclaimed their usurpation of courtesy from the courts of the Old World ' (1982: 95) . On both sides of the Atlantic, these 'fashions' were prescribed by a host of etiquette books that instructed the nouveau riche and the emergent middle class in an appropriate external 'show' of behaviour rather than the internal development of character. Contra Jacques (1996) , the discourse of character did not 'triumph' nor was the old feudal order simply displaced. Instead there was a 'battle' between different bourgeois social codes with 'old order' values of etiquette and external appearance proving 'triumphant' in both England and America. For Halttunen and Morgan, this triumph occurred because the latter codes were more appropriate to the emergent bourgeois as a result of their need for impression management within a developing industrial society. As Halttunen puts it, 'within the new [US] corporate context, personality skills, such as that subtle quality called charm, were more useful to the ambitious youth than the qualities of industry, sobriety and frugality ' (1982: 207) .
Contra Jacques (1996) , such studies suggest that there was no prior unified bourgeois self associated with a 'discourse of character'. Since there was no prior unified self, there was also no distinct rupture. Instead, Karen Halttunen suggests that a 'gradual replacement ' (1982: 207) occurred in 19th-century North American bourgeois subjectivity, while other social historians such as Marjorie Morgan emphasize continuities from the Renaissance onwards.
Halttunen notes that something akin to Jacques's 'character ethic' was relevant in the US to 'an early industrial capitalist stage ... dominated by self-employed entrepreneurs ' (1982: 207) . Yet it gradually 'lost out' because of the need for 'show' and impression management among urban dwellers for whom 'the notion of "stranger" loses its meaning' (Giddens 1991: 152) . In this society of strangers 'where no one occupied a fixed social position, the question "Who am I?" loomed large' (Halttunen 1982: xv) . In this context, refashioned aristocratic codes enabled the socially climbing American middle classes to show that they 'were true ladies and gentlemen deserving of the higher social place to which they aspired' (Halttunen 1982: xvii) . Once again, contra Jacques, they provided a means for the aspirant 'middling sort' to 'puff ... themselves' up (Morgan 1994: 117) through the 'all-powerful polish' (Morgan 1994: 117) of refashioned aristocratic codes of etiquette and gentility.
Morgan's and Halttunen's analyses, and those of other social historians (e.g. Blumin 1989) , do not therefore support Jacques's (1996) contention that there was a mid-19th-century dominant bourgeois discourse of character which was then 'ruptured' by growing industrialization. Instead they illustrate how there were competing bourgeois social codes throughout the 19th century in America and England. They suggest that Jacques uses a questionable closure, with Freeman Hunt's espousal of 'character' placed in one historical 'box' and the emergent 'employee' put in another. Yet such closure is always problematic. In particular, those who are placed in a box may try to 'jump out'. For instance, Jacques portrays Freeman Hunt as the defender of the honest business 'character'. Yet as Stuart Blumin notes, Hunt's Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review was specifically aimed at a bourgeois 'commercial class'. It repeatedly espoused what might be called a 'commercial theory of value' (Blumin 1989: 80, 128) where value is seen as created by markets and consumption rather than by the production of goods. As Blumin argues, this argument 'appears in a variety of forms throughout the [Merchant's] magazine's many issues ' (1989: 128) . Following Blumin, Freeman Hunt does not therefore appear as Jacques's defendant of business 'character'. Instead he serves as the promoter of the very divisions that Jacques associates with the later 'ruptures' of industrialization and the employee, such as that between consumption and production (see above). Rather than being emblematic of a particular position, Freeman Hunt appears as the symbol of the problems of Jacques's closure -namely, that there are competing trends at any one time. In sum, Jacques achieves his effect by conflating different social classes, namely the emergent bourgeois addressed in Hunt's Merchant's Magazine and the new industrial working class, and by ignoring the competing social codes current within the bourgeoisie throughout the 19th century.
What does all of this imply for history and subjectivity? I wish to suggest, that contra Jacques, and to some extent, Kieser, Brewer, Halttunen and Morgan, there is rarely a simple triumph of a particular social code (in the sense that there is a 'displacement' and rejection of an alternative). Even Kieser and Brewer's 'social discipline' may not have represented an integrated and well-defined code of subjectivity. Instead this 18th-century social discipline may simply have contained and prefigured later 19th-century competition, such as that between the moral imperative of Jacques's 'upright' character and the 'show' and 'puffery' of Halttunen and Morgan's refashioned aristocratic codes of gentility and civility. For instance, one implication of Brewer's analysis is that the 18th-century English business discipline of 'affability, courtesy and reliability' (Brewer 1982: 215, emphasis added) already contained tensions between the growing desire to be 'a businessman of character' who can evidence reliability and probity, and refashioned courtly concerns to 'show' courtoisie and civilité which allowed businessmen to appear as 'gentleman' traders. In sum, differing social codes are likely to coexist and intermingle across time. As Jacques acknowledges, Freeman Hunt's 'discourse of character' still remains alive and well in 'the present day' (Jacques 1996: 39) , particularly within management discourses such as leadership, motivation, TQM or BPR (Jacques 1996: 146-173 ). Yet because Jacques believes in the reality of rupture, he must portray the discourse of character as being an 'outdated' myth (1996: 160) . In spite of the supposed rupture of notions of 'character', Jacques asserts that we must still 'exorcise the ghost of Freeman Hunt' (1996: 163) . However this problem only arises for Jacques because he largely adheres to a sense of discontinuity and rupture. In consequence he ignores the way in which people 'play' with social codes and how they are rarely simply displaced at any one time but remain a part of our cultural repertoire. Freeman Hunt encapsulated a range of codes of social discipline rather than a dominant 'discourse of character'.
What does this imply for continuity and discontinuity? I would suggest that it means that we do not need to choose between continuity and discontinuity since it is possible for researchers to explore, and be sensitive to, the possibilities of either orientation. To do otherwise is to create unnecessary closure. For instance, in the context of the present paper, it appears equally foreclosing to assume that there is either no continuity or no discontinuity between, say, Brewer's 'business discipline' and subsequent industrialization. In addition, continuity and discontinuity do not present mutually exclusive historical stances. Different theoretical stances can be employed toward similar ends. As Deirdre McCloskey argues, 'continuity and discontinuity are narrative devices, to be chosen for their storytelling virtues ' (1990: 22) . I would suggest that, just as we should expect discontinuity, we should not dismiss stories of continuity. In relation to subjectivity and the self, we need to retain the poststructural emphasis on plurality and mobility but recognize that pluralities contain different forms of continuity. Individuals and groups play with different, and possibly competing, social codes, refashioning them in the context of figurational change. The emotional and behavioural displays of present-day organizations (e.g. Hochschild 1983 ) may partly reflect that of Kieser and Brewer's bourgeois society or even Elias's courtly society, albeit that such reflection is likely to include the discontinuities consequent upon inflection, mutation, deviation, and so on. Yet mutations and deviations still represent continuities. They mutate or deviate from something already existent. To deny the possibility of continuity is to assume the likelihood that historical development is characterized by the emergence of 'clean slates', entirely novel situations which owe nothing to the past. 'Revolutions' represent reactions to past episodes rather than truly new worlds (see McCloskey 1990: 16-18 ). They are not discontinuous from the past but rather re-invent and work from it. In this sense, the distinction represented by historical continuity vs discontinuity is really about the form of continuity, whether it is an inflected, deviated or mutated continuity, or the kind of inverted continuity stereotypically represented by revolution. To put this another way, the 'dis' of discontinuity is misleading since it suggests a mutually exclusive 'other'. I am suggesting instead that it would be more helpful to see discontinuities as particular kinds of continuity. Though I cannot develop this argument here, one way to see this is in terms of the perception of pace or speed (see Newton 2003b) . Though notions of speed and 'acceleration' may be questionable, whether in relation to the French Revolution or the present day (Virilio 1986 (Virilio , 1991 Luke 1998) , the sense of speed nevertheless captures the way in which history appears to represent different processes of continuity, whether 'fast' and 'revolutionary' or slow and intractable. Historical analysis requires a sensitivity to these different forms and paces of continuity (Newton 2003b ), whether we observe 'fast' inflections, deflections, deviations and inversions or 'slow' extensions, reflections, retractions and intractabilities.
Conclusion
What does the foregoing imply for organization studies? First, it reminds us that organization studies still exhibits a disinterest in the historical context in which organizing has developed, particularly when compared with other academic fields of inquiry (Brady 1997) . In the present case, it is important to remember that the association between organization and subjectivity is not just a 20th-or 21st-century issue (as reflected in the concern with, say, organizational culture or emotional labour), but one that may have characterized the earliest forms of modern organization. Second, it indicates that historical analysis cannot be dismissed through a crude reading of postmodern argument (Evans 1997) . For instance, there is no mutual exclusivity between historical continuity and discontinuity, and certainly not one that could justify treating them as though they reflected supposedly hostile 'camps'. The social terrain is neither composed of total fragmentation, fluidity and discontinuity nor total stability, solidity, coherence and continuity. To present history as though it involved a choice between mutually exclusive assumptions is to invoke a closure which benefits neither debate nor analysis. History is of course about representation and social construction. Yet as McCloskey (1990) implies, historians can be playful with method through, say, exploring the possibilities presented by stories of continuity and discontinuity. In narrative terms, I have played in this paper with different kinds of historical story. In the first place, I sought to dramatize the possibilities of history, to note how the social discipline of organizational life can be seen within the history of modern organization, and may even characterize, as Kieser (1998) suggests, the earliest forms of modern organization. Then I sought to add to this 'drama' by exploring figurational changes surrounding freemasonry. I employed Brewer (1982) to illustrate the slow shift in interdependency which occurred when the asymmetries of a pre-modern English client economy were slowly transformed through devices such as credit. In Brewer's hands, freemasonry appears interwoven with credit interdependencies because English Masonic lodges provided a convivial setting in which to meet creditors and partners as well as a collective insurance against the risk of debt. In so doing, the liberation of freemasonry (from pre-modern tradition) was also interwoven with the liberation of credit networks since the latter eroded the client economy and shifted power relations by providing an alternative source of finance to reliance on patrician favour.
In sum, these historical stories are helpful in exploring two interrelated propositions: that organized subjectivity characterized the earliest forms of modern organization and that such subjectivity needs to be seen, following Elias, in the context of figurational change in interdependency network. Yet in exploring these historical analyses, I was aware of recent debate within social history, sociology and organization studies which questioned historical method, particularly in relation to Foucault (e.g. Bermingham 1995; Baert 1998; Carter et al. 2002) . My discussion of these issues led to conclusions which lack the drama of negation. Rather than simply negating the unified and continuous subject through its opposite, the fragile, discontinuous and fragmented self, I preferred the less glamorous notion of 'shared fragments' which could be selectively continuous, at least in the short to medium term, within and between individuals. Instead of the image of a 'dominant' subjectivity strongly implicit in Jacques's discourse of character, I sought an image of a mobile, fragmented, yet selectively continuous, subjectivity. Similarly, I resisted either a 'bold' negation of historical continuity through grand narratives of discontinuity and rupture, or a 'thorough' defence of continuity. 'Falling' for either of these options represents an unnecessary polarization and closure that limits the possibilities of historical analysis. I preferred the notion of a range of continuities from stasis all the way to inversion and 'revolution'. There are many variants of continuity, from the time-resilient intractabilities of, say, social inequality to the 'radical' revolutions and inversions against such inequality. All work from and against a past, and therefore represent some form of continuity with that past. In researching history, organization and organizing, there is no reason why we cannot explore across this range of continuity in relation to both the form and pace of change. To some extent, I have tried to do so in the present paper by working across the accounts found in Kieser, Brewer, Elias and Jacques, and the seemingly divergent assumptions of continuity and discontinuity which they contain. The contrast between these accounts enabled me to refine my argument and be sensitive to, say, the questionable images of closure and 'triumph' found not just in Jacques's discourse of character but also in Kieser and Brewer's social discipline. Mine is a plea for openness in historical assumption and method even though I am aware that such a plea lacks the drama of a thorough defence of historical tradition (Evans 1997) , or a dismissal of some of the key assumptions of this tradition, or a clear rebuttal of Foucauldian argument . I wish to close by stressing that a host of other histories of organization and subjectivity remain unexplored by organization studies scholars, such as that of profession, religion, colonialism, class, gender, etc. I believe that much scope exists in this field through blurring the boundaries between organization study, social history, historical sociology, literary criticism and so on. In this paper, I have begun to explore across such boundaries through interrelating and questioning the work of organizational researchers (Kieser and Jacques), social historians (Brewer, Halttunen and Morgan) , and those who deliberately work across philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities (Elias and Foucault) . Yet I have really only scratched the surface of the possibilities of such analysis and there remains considerable scope for integrative organizational study that works across current fields of historical endeavour.
1
In this respect they differ from German freemasonry which Kieser argues were composed 'of the absolute top layers of the society ' (1998: 54) . Elias (1994 Elias ( , 1996 argues that there was a much greater division in the 18th century between the upper and middle classes in Germany than in England or France, and the narrower composition of German freemasonry should perhaps be seen in this context. 2
This aspect of Brewer's thesis receives support from social historians such as Margaret Jacob and economic historians such as Douglas Knoop and G. P. Jones. Jacob draws on a range of Masonic documents, though particularly those associated with the main 18th-century lodge in Amsterdam, La Bien Aimée (held at the library of the Grand Lodge of the Netherlands, The Hague), the Paris Grand Lodge (held at the Bibiothèque Nationale, Paris), and the Masonic lodge at Dundee, Scotland (based on varied sources though especially the Archives and Record Centre, Dundee), all of which are rare for the completeness of their records. Based on these and other documents, Jacob asserts that common to Dutch, French, Scottish and English freemasonry was a desire to 'mitigate and negotiate the effects of the market ' (1993: 115) . For instance, Jacob notes how the letters and manuscripts of the Paris Grand Lodge indicate that 'no other agency of church or state was able to provide sufficient net for men and women who for whatever reason were in danger of falling through, literally, as their letters tell us, of starving to death ' (1993: 105) . Similarly the manuscripts of La Bien Aimée at Amsterdam suggest that 'the vagaries and uncertainties of market life were never far from day-to-day concerns' (Jacob, 1991: 165) . Jacob notes that the Amsterdam lodge 'had a poor box for the relief of [Masonic] brothers who regularly appealed to it ' (1991: 165) , while the Paris Grand Lodge 'had a committee that did nothing else but dispense charity' which helped to relieve the 'miserable state' that might befall freemasons (1993: 103). Knoop and Jones provide further examples of charity given to fellow masons in Scotland and England. With the former, they note how a manuscript of a Masonic lodge at Dumfries in the late 17th century included the precept that masons 'shall at all times cheerfully distribute your Charity to ye reliefe of distrest & sicke fellow masons' (Knoop and Jones, 1947: 200) . However most of Knoop and Jones's attention is devoted to documenting the development and formalization of such charity at the Grand Lodge in London in the early part of the 18th century. They note that fellow masons were given relief through this charity as early as 1717 and that a standing committee for the formalization of charity to 'brethren' was agreed at the Annual Assembly of the Grand Lodge in January 1730 (Knoop and Jones 1947: 200-202) .
The research of Brewer, Jacob, and Knoop and Jones suggest that despite their differences, British, French and Dutch freemasonry shared a common concern to provide welfare to 'distressed' fellow masons and thereby defray the perils of the market. Together they support Brewer's thesis that freemasonry helped to address the risk entailed in credit and commerce. 3
As I argue elsewhere (Newton 2003a) , the history of credit and money does not provide consistent support for Eliasian argument. On the one hand, the localized, often face to face, credit relations observed by Brewer (and other social historians such as Muldrew, 1998 ) support Elias's contention that lengthening interdependencies are associated with increased social discipline. On the other hand, the modern sense of paper money challenges this association. Instead of social discipline, modern money allows for a 'growing [social] indifference' (Simmel 1990: 441) deriving from the 'abstractness of its form' (Simmel 1990: 504) . Though modern money involves extremely complex and lengthy credit networks, it does not necessarily encourage the social discipline that Elias associated with such networks. Present-day consumers can remain largely indifferent to those producing the goods and services they buy. In sum, Elias's association between interdependency complexity and social discipline appears contingent upon the character of that interdependency. 4
It is important to distinguish this sense of habitus from that employed by Pierre Bourdieu (1984) . Elias's reference to habitus clearly has a family resemblance to its now betterknown usage by Bourdieu. Yet there remain major differences. First, Bourdieu's work remains rather static and lacks the sense of historical development found within Elias (Mouzelis 1995) . As Chris Shilling notes, 'Bourdieu is unable to account fully for the sort of historical changes which occur in the body and which have been examined elsewhere by Norbert Elias' (1993: 146) . Second, Bourdieu does remain open to the criticism that his image of human agency is passive since people appeared trapped within the interaction between particular 'fields' and their habitus (Alexander 1995; Mouzelis 1995) . In contrast, Elias continually stresses that human beings are active agents, a stress reflected in Elias's game models (Elias 1970) and in his emphasis on figurational change, such as that from a courtly to a bourgeois habitus. Equally, as noted above, Elias stresses how individuals are embedded within particular habitus but are not defined by them.
